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This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independence in a monetary policy
game with a conservative central banker. It tries to explain the optimal degree of central
bank independence and conservativeness by four economic and political determinants, both
theoretically and empirically. There appears to be a trade off between central bank
independence and conservativeness. Then, by comparing the optimal degree of
conservativeness and independence with the actual degree of independence, we want to
identify the optimal degree of conservativeness for the countries participating in EMU.
The authors are grateful to Bas van Aarle, Alex Cukierman, Lex Hoogduin, Ruud Lubbers,
Bennett McCallum and Eric Schaling for their valuable suggestions. Of course, the usual
disclaimer applies.
1. Introduction
This paper deals with the following fundamental questions. First, it tries to explain the
optimal degree of central bankindependence and conservativenessby four economic and
political determinants (the natural rate of unemployment, society’s preferences for
unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization, the variance of productivity
shocks and the benefits of unanticipated inflation) both theoretically and empirically. The
empirical results are only given for the (twelve) member states of the European Union.1)
Second, we want to identify the optimal degree ofc nservativenessof the national central
banks of countries constituting EMU.
The paper is organized as follows. Central bank independence is included in the model of
a conservative central banker and the trade off between independence and conservativeness
is discussed in Section 2. In this Section, also the relationship between (independence and)
conservativeness of the central banks and the four economic and political determinants is
investigated with an extension of the Rogoff (1985) model. Furthermore, we test this
relationship empirically using a latent variables approach (LISREL) for nineteen industrial
countries including the member states of the European Union in Section 3. Also, the
optimal degree of conservativeness of the central banks is identified for countries
participating in EMU. Finally, our conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2. The Rogoff (1985) model
In the Rogoff (1985) model, society can make itself better off by appointing a conservative
central banker who does not share the social objective function, but instead places "too
large" a weight on inflation rate stabilization relative to output stabilization. In this
simplified version, output is given by the Lucas supply function which is reformulated in
terms of unemployment ut:
(1)
whereθ>0 denotes the slope of the Phillips curve,πt is inflation, πe is expected inflation,
u~>0 is the natural rate of unemployment and µt is a serially uncorrelated productivity shock
with mean zero and varianceσµ². The timing of events is as follows: firstπe is set
(nominal wage contracts are signed), then the shock µt occurs and finally the central banker
setsπt.
1) On the contrary, Eijffinger and Schaling (1995a and b) focus on nineteen industrial countries, including
also Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. Eijffinger and
Schaling (1995b) formulate and estimate an open economy version of the Eijffinger and Schaling
(1995a) model.
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Figure 1: Timing of events in the Rogoff model
Society’s loss function is given by:
(2)
where the weight on output stabilizationχ > 0. The target level of inflation and the target
level of unemployment are set to zero. Rogoff now shows that it is optimal for society to
choose a conservative central banker who assigns "too large" a weight to inflation in his
loss function:
(3)
whereε, the additional weight on the inflation goal, lies between zero and infinity (0 <ε
< ∞).
Substituting (1) in (3), taking first order conditions with respect toπt and solving for




Policy rule (4) shows that the introduction of a conservative central banker (ε > 0) leads
























conservativeness of the central banker. This is the trade off between credibility and
flexibility that is already apparent in the Rogoff model. It can be shown that the optimal
value for ε, in terms of social loss function (2), is positive but finite.2) This implies that it
2) Rogoff uses an envelope theorem to show this. In Eijffinger and Schaling (1995a and b) a graphical
method is used to determine the optimal degree of conservativeness. Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and
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is optimal for society to appoint a conservative central banker.
2.1 From Conservativeness to Independence
The independence of a central bank can be seen as the extent to which it determines
monetary policy without interference of the government. In the Rogoff model, this can be
incorporated in the loss function that determines monetary policy, Mt. This function is a
weightedaverage of the central bank's loss function It and society's loss function Lt where
the weight 0<γ<1 is the degree of central bank independence:3)
(7)Mt γ It (1 γ )Lt
Substituting society’s loss function (2) and central bank’s loss function (3) into (7) gives:
(8)
So, what matters for monetary policy isγε: the product of independence and
conservativeness of the central bank. There is an optimal degree of independence and
conservativeness (γε*) which minimizes Mt. In practice, the degree of (legal) independence
of a central bank is fixed as measured by the legal indices of independence which reflect
the central bank laws in various countries. The level of conservativeness, however, can
generally be chosen by the central bank. Hence, a lack of central bank independence can
be compensated by choosing more conservative central bankers. On the basis of economic
and political determinants, we determine the optimal degree of independence and
conservativeness. Then, given theactual degree of independence for each country, we are
able to identify itsoptimal degree of conservativenessε* (see Figure 2).
Schaling (1995) are able to derive a closed form solution.
3) This implies that central bank independence (γ) is defined as the degree in which the central bank
determines effectively the monetary policy’s loss function (Mt).
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Figure 2: The Trade Off between Conservativeness and Independence
2.2 The Optimal Independence and Conservativeness of a Central Bank
This brings us to a key issue in the political economy of central banking: the relationship
between institutional design and individual and collective preferences. Here the question to
be dealt with is thenormative issue of how conservative a central bank (CB) should be,
i.e. the optimal degree of conservativeness of a CB.
An important study in this field is Cukierman (1994). Building on the seminal paper of
Lohmann (1992), he wants to identify the economic and political factors that induce
politicians to delegate more or less authority to the central bank. His theory predicts that
central bank independence will be higher, the larger the employment-motivated inflationary
bias, the higher political instability and the larger the government debt are.
These predictions were tested and, subsequently, rejected by De Haan and Van ’t Hag
(1995) using regression analysis (OLS method). In testing Cukierman’s model, they
employ measures of central bank independence that in - Rogoff’s (1985) terminology -
reflect the strength of the ‘conservative bias’ of the central bank as embodied in the law.
In Cukierman’s model, following Lohmann (1992), central bank independence is defined as
the cost of overriding the central bank, rather than as the degree ofc nservativeness.
Cukierman’s (1994) theory also generates propositions aboutoptimal regimes, whilst the
legal measures describeactual monetary regimes.
In this paper we try to overcome these pitfalls. Building on the Rogoff (1985) model,
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we distinguish between independence and conservativeness of a CB. Using a graphical
method, we develop a new way of determining the optimal degree of independence and
conservativeness.4) As in Lohmann (1992), this degree depends on the balance between
credibility and flexibility. However, unlike Rogoff and Lohmann, we are able to express
the upper and lower bounds of the interval containing the optimal degree of independence
and conservativeness in terms of the structural parameters of the model.
Furthermore, we derive a number of propositions concerning the relationship between
economic and political factors and the optimal degree of independence and
conservativeness. We show that optimal central bank independence and conservativeness is
higher, the higher the natural rate of unemployment, the greater the benefits of
unanticipated inflation (the slope of the Phillips curve), the less inflation-averse society and
the smaller the variance of productivity shocks.
After we have found the optimal degree of independence and conservativeness for
each country and knowing the actual degree of independence of its central bank, we can
derive the optimal degree of conservativeness of the CB.
Using γε instead of ε in the expression for inflation (4) and the expression for
unemployment (6), substituting these two expressions into the Central Bank’s loss function
(8) and taking expectations yields the following expected loss for society with a central
banker with independenceγ and conservativenessε:
(9)
The first term in (9) is due to the inflationary bias and can be reduced by making the
central bank more independent or conservative (a largerγε). The second term measures
how well the central bank manages to keep inflation constant. This variance can also be
reduced by making the central bank more independent or conservative. The third term is a
dead-weight loss due to the natural rate of unemployment. Obviously, this cannot be
reduced through monetary policy. The last term is the variance of unemployment (or
output). This term increases when the central bank becomes more independent or
conservative. When we drop the dead-weight loss and take the two variances together, we
get the following:
(9’)
The first term in (9’) is related to the natural rate of unemployment and can be seen as the
4) The theoretical analysis used here is largely based on Eijffinger and Schaling (1995 a and b). However,
these papers make no distinction between independence and conservativeness.
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credibility component in the social loss; the second term is related to the variance of
productivity shocks and represents theflexibility component in the social loss.
Minimizing the expected social loss with respect toγε yields the following first order
condition:
(10)
The first term in (10) is alwaysnegative and reflects the credibility effect of a more
independent or conservative central bank: a higherγε reduces society's credibility
problem. The second term is alwayspositive and reflects the flexibility effect of more
central bank independence or conservativeness: a higherγε means less stabilization.
Figure 3: The Optimal Degree of Conservativeness
2.3 The Determinants of Optimal Independence and Conservativeness
In Eijffinger and Schaling (1995a) it is shown that a unique solution for the optimalγε
exists. Furthermore, the comparative static properties of this equilibrium are derived by
means of a graphical method as is illustrated in Figure 3. First, the first-order condition
(10) is rewritten as:
(11)
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The function F on the right-hand side of equation (11) is monotonically decreasing inγε.
The left-hand side is a 45˚ line through the origin and the intersection point gives the
optimal degree of independence and conservativenessγε*. The comparative static
properties of the optimal degree of independence and conservativeness can be derived from
the partial derivatives of the function F. If F shifts upward, the intersection point shifts to
the right.5)
It turns out that the higher thenatural rate of unemployment( he higher ˜u), the higher the
optimal degree of conservativeness and independence of the CB. The intuition behind this
result is the following. A higher natural rate of unemployment implies a higher time-
consistent rate of inflation (See equation (4)) and, consequently, a higher credibility
component of the social loss function. This means that society’s credibility problem
increases. Hence, with an unaltered relative weight placed on inflation versus
unemployment stabilization the monetary authorities’ commitment to fight inflation is now
too low.
The higher society’s preferences for unemployment stabilization relative to inflation
stabilization (the higherχ) in a country, the higher the optimal degree of conservativeness
and independence of the CB. The underlying intuition is that, if citizens become more
concerned with unemployment and more lax about inflation, the time-consistent inflation
rate goes up (See equation (4)). Therefore, society’s credibility problem becomes more
pressing. With an unchanged relative weight placed on inflation stabilization, the balance
between credibility and flexibility needs to be adjusted in favor of increased commitment
of fighting inflation.
The higher thevariance of productivity shocks(the higherσµ2) in a country, the lower the
optimal degree of conservativeness and independence of a CB. This result may be
explained as follows. If the variance of productivity shocks increases, ceteris paribus, the
economy becomes more unstable. Thus, the need for active stabilization policy increases
(the flexibility component of the social loss function goes up). With an unaltered relative
weight placed on inflation stabilization the balance between credibility and flexibility needs
to be shifted towards more monetary accommodation.





χ> (1 γ ε)
2θ2
unanticipated inflation(the higher θ) in a country, the higher the optimal degree of
conservativeness and independence of a CB. The intuition behind this proposition is that, if
the benefits of unanticipated inflation rise (See equation (1)), it becomes more tempting to
inflate the economy. Therefore, society’s credibility problem gains in importance. With the
same emphasis on inflation stabilization, the balance between credibility and flexibility
5) For a formal derivation of the properties of the function F in the first-order condition, see Appendix B
in Eijffinger and Schaling (1995a).
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needs to be shifted towards increased commitment to price stability.6)
3. Empirical Evidence on the Optimal Conservativeness
In this Section, the economic and political determinants of the optimal degree of central
bank conservativeness and independence (γε*) discussed before are empirically inves-
tigated. We will use, for that purpose, a latent variables approach (LISREL) to make a
distinction between theoptimal and actual degree of conservativeness and independence.7)
The reasons for this distinction are two-fold. First, the propositions derived in the former
Section are related to the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence andot to
the actual degree. These propositions formulate the relationship between the optimal degree
and four economic and political factors in a country:
- the natural rate of unemployment (˜u);
- society’s preferences for unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization
(χ);
- the variance of productivity shocks (σµ2); and
- the slope of the Phillips curve (θ).
These determinants, reflecting the economic and political structure of a country, explain
theoretically the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence in that country.8)
Second, there is also an identification and measurement problem. Whereas the determinants
will change frequently during the sample period, i.e. the period 1960-1993, the actual
degree may change much less in the same period. The stickiness may, for example, result
from the fact that central bank laws arevery occasionallyadjusted in the industrial
countries during the post-war period.
The actual degree of central bank independence is approximated by thelegal degree,
according to the four main indices of central bank independence in the literature. The
index of Alesina (AL) is a narrow measure of independence and based on Alesina (1988,
1989). The total index of political and economic independence of Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (GMT) is a broad measure based on Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991).
The index of policy independence of Eijffinger and Schaling (ES) is, however, a narrow
measure based on Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, 1993a) and extended by Eijffinger and
Van Keulen (1995). The unweighted legal index of Cukierman (LVAU) is a very broad
measure of independence and derived from Cukierman (1992). These four legal indices
6) Eijffinger and Schaling (1995b) provide an open economy version and find that the optimal degree of
conservativeness is higher when the real exchange rate variability and the openness of the economy is
smaller.
7) A clear overview of the latent variables approach is given by Aigner, Hsiao, Kapteyn and Wansbeek
(1984). For an application of this approach to the determinants of central bank independence only, see
Eijffinger and Schaling (1995a and b) and Appendix A.
8) The proxies for these economic and political variables and the sources of the data are given in Appendix
C.
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have beenlognormalized (AL, GMT, ESand LVAU) so that the natural logarithms of their
values range from zero to one.
For our cross-country analysis, initially, a set of nineteen industrial (OECD) countries -
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States - is taken which are ranked by the above-mentioned
indices.9) The sample period that we have chosen covers more than thirty years, namely the
period 1960-1993 (for ˜u: 1960-1988). The argument to choose such a long period is that it
contains many political and business cycles.
The idea behind the model is the following. The optimal degree of conservativeness and
independence is a function of the determinants,γε* = f(X), where f is a function and X are
the determinants. Taking logs, we rewrite the equation as log(γ) = g(X) - log(ε*), where g
is a function. Now, we use the log of the legal indices as proxies for log(γ) which we
interpret as actual independence. The residual (-log(ε*)), which we calculate by the
difference between the average of the (log) legal indices and g(X), can be interpreted as a
measure for optimal conservativeness. Using this approach has several implications. First,
by interpreting the residual as optimal conservativeness, we implicitly assume that optimal
conservativeness is uncorrelated with the determinants. Put differently, the part of
independence that cannot be explained by the determinants, will be compensated by
conservativeness. Furthermore, it means that every CB has the optimal degree of
independence as long as the right level of conservativeness is chosen.
3.1 Estimation Results
Table 1 shows the estimation results for the optimal degree of conservativeness and
independence (γε*) using a latent variables approach (LISREL).10) For convenience the
restriction that the disturbance terms in the model are uncorrelated is imposed.11) From
Table 1, it can be seen that only one explanatory variable (θ) is significant at a 5%
significance level. Apparently, the benefits from unanticipated inflation do play an
important role. The other explanatory variables have relatively low t-values which could,
probably, be attributed to the many restrictions still imposed on the model. Nevertheless,
the model as such is not rejected according to a Likelihood Ratio-test for the model to be
9) By including not only the twelve member states of the European Union but also seven non-member
states, we have sufficient data to estimate the LISREL model. For two member states - Greece and
Portugal - no data on the natural rate of unemployment (˜u, proxied by NAIRU) were available, whereas
Luxembourg has a monetary union with Belgium.
10) The idea behind LISREL (Linear Structural Relations) is to compare a sample covariance matrix with
the parametric structure imposed on it by the hypothesized model. Under normality, LISREL delivers
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimates of the model parameters. For more details, see
Appendix A. See also Aigner et al. (1984).
11) Two of these restrictions, however, have to be rejected according to a univariate Lagrange Multiplier-
test and are, thereby, lifted. For the relaxation of the restrictions, see Appendix B.
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of the specified structure (see the Appendix).
Therefore, we have calculated theoptimal degree of conservativeness and independence
(henceforth OCI) on the basis of the economic and political determinants for each country.
Given theactual independence being the unweighted average of the legal indices of central
bank independence (CBI), we are able to determine the optimal conservativeness (OC) for
the twelve member states of the European Union. Here we use an average of broad and
narrow indices. As the indices are highly correlated (see Eijffinger and De Haan (1995))
splitting the broad an narrow indices up wouldn’t yield much different results.
3.2 The Optimal Conservativeness
Rogoff (1985) has shown that society can make itself better off by appointing a
"conservative" central banker who places andditional weight on inflation stabilization
(price stability) than society. From Section 2 it is evident that central bank independence
and conservativeness are (close)ubstitutesof each other. An independent central bank can
afford to be less conservative than a dependent central bank. Therefore, the optimal
conservativeness may be interpreted as the degree ofdiscretion (flexibility) in monetary
policy which can be afforded by the central bank: the lower the optimal conservativeness
of the central bank, the higher the degree of discretion it can afford in monetary policy
making.12)
Furthermore, the average long-term interest rates (period 1990:1 - 1995:8) of the twelve
member states of the European Union13) - excluded are Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal -
can be seen as thelikelihood according to the financial markets that these countries will
enter the third stage of EMU. These long-term interest rates are a reflection of the chances
of the respective countries to comply with the convergence criteria set out in the
Maastricht Treaty.
If we compare the optimal conservativeness (OC) and the long-term interest rates in the
twelve member states as in Figure 4, there appears to be a significant, positive relationship
between both variables14), although the level of long-term interest rates is, of course, also
influenced by other factors than monetary policy such as the evolution of the government
deficit. Apparently, countries with a relatively high degree of optimal conservativeness are
not considered to be likely candidates for the third stage of EMU according to the financial
markets.
12) See also the comparison between German and Italian monetary policy by Fratianni and Huang (1995).
They conclude that the Bundesbank could afford during the period 1984-1994 more deviations from
their monetary targets than the Banca d’Italia by its higher reputation.
13) The long-term interest rates are taken from OECD Main Economic Indicators, 1995.
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Long-term interest rate = 9.34 + 4.00 * OC R2 = 0.37 DF = 10
Figure 4: The Optimal Conservativeness (OC) and Long-Term Interest Rates
(24.483) (2.404)
4. Conclusions
What are the main conclusions from the theoretical and empirical analysis on the optimal
degree of conservativeness? The optimal degree of central bank independence and
conservativeness depends positively on the natural rate of unemployment, society’s
preferences for unemployment stabilization relative to inflation stabilization and the
benefits of unanticipated inflation and negatively on the variance of productivity shocks.
Using a LISREL-model we estimated the relationship between four proxies of legal central
bank independence and the four economic and political determinants. Then, we determine
the optimal degree of independence and conservativeness for each country based on the
determinants. Given the actual degree of independence we calculate the optimal degree of
conservativeness. The empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between the
optimal conservativeness and the long-term interest rates in the twelve member states of
the European Union. Apparently, countries with a relatively high optimal conservativeness
are not considered to be likely candidates for the third stage of EMU. From a normative
point of view, countries with a high optimal degree of conservativeness should either grant
12
more independence to their central bank or change the determinants so that they are more
in line with the current level of independence.
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Appendix
A. The Estimated Model
Let γ be the latentdependentvariable, i.e. the latent degree of central bank independence,
and x be the observedexplanatoryvariables, in our case the four ultimate determinants of
central bank independence, satisfying a system of linear structural relations
γ = B x - ε, (A.1)
with B being the vector of coefficients andε the disturbances. It is assumed thatγ, x and
ε havezero expectations, and that x andε are uncorrelated. Instead of the latent variable
γ, the vector of proxies y isobserved, such that
y = Λ γ + δ (A.2)
with δ the vector of measurement errors,uncorrelated with γ and ε, but possibly
correlated among themselves andΛ=[1 1 1 1]’. The observed vectors x and y are measured
as deviations form their means, thus, havingzero expectations and a covariance equal to
E[x y]. Also, γ andδ have zero expectations.
Therefore, y is a vector ofobservedlegal indices of central bank independence (AL, GMT,
ES and LVAU), lognormalized so that the natural logarithm of their values range from 0 to




















and x is a vector ofobservedexplanatory variables, being the non-accelerating inflation
rate of unemployment (NAIRU), the percentage of years of a left-wing government
(WLEFT), the variance of output growth (VPROD) and the compensation of employees as











































































Furthermore,Φ and Ψ are defined as the covariance matrix of x and the variance ofε,
respectively, andΘδ as the true variance-covariance matrix ofδ. Then it follows from the
above assumptions that the variance-covariance matrixΣ of [y’, x’]’ is
Σ =
Λ [BΦB’ + Ψ] Λ’ + Θδ ΛBΦ
(A.5)
ΦB’ Λ’ Φ
where Λ=[1 1 1 1]’ and Θγ is diagonal, which implies that the correlation between the
observed legal indices of central bank independence (y) isonly caused by the latent
optimal degree (η).
The parameters occurring inΣ (B, Φ, Ψ, Θδ) are estimated on the basis of the matrix S of
second sample moments of x and y. Given the structure that matrix (A.5) imposes on the
sample covariance matrix, LISREL computes FIML estimates of the parameters when [y’,
x’] is normally distributed, i.e. when the following criterion is minimized
ln Σ + tr [SΣ-1] (A.6)
On the basis of the restrictions given in the former section, LISREL computesFull
Information Maximum Likelihoodestimates of the parameters of the model, explaining the
relationship between the degree of central bank independence (γ) and the explanatory
variables (NAIRU, WLEFT, VPROD and SLOPE). Then, using the parameters we have
estimated, we predict the optimal degree of central bank independence and
conservativeness for each country (OCI). The comparison between theop imal degree of
independence and conservativeness and thelegal indices of central bank independence
(AL, GMT, ES and LVAU) can be made. The difference between the optimal degree of
independence and conservativeness on one hand and the average of the lognormalized legal
indices of central bank independence (CBI) on the other hand, is interpreted as optimal
conservativeness (OC).
If the predicted optimal degree of independence and conservativeness (OCI) exceeds the
average of legal indices (CBI), then the optimal degree of conservativeness (OC) is
positive, indicating that the central bank should be more conservative than the average
central bank. Of course, the optimal degree of conservativeness is negative if the optimal
degree of conservativeness and independence is smaller than CBI.
15
B. The Relaxation of Restrictions
In the first model, we imposed the restriction that the disturbance terms in the model are
uncorrelated. The statistics of this model show a Likelihood Ratio-test for the null hypo-
thesis that the predicted covariance matrix is of the specified structure against the
alternative that the covariance matrix is unconstrained. For the first model, the null
hypothesis is rejected implying that the specified structure was not correct. Apparently, too
many restrictions were imposed. Testing structural models, a univariate Lagrange
Multiplier-test is carried out for most elements in the model matrices that are constrained
to equal constants. When the test statistic, having aχ21-distribution, has a value larger than
3.84 the restriction is rejected at a significance level of 5%.
In the first regression, with all restrictions imposed, the constraint that the disturbances of
the GMT-index and the variance of productivity shocks (σµ²) are uncorrelated is rejected.
The test statistic has a value of 10.00 which is the highest of all restrictions. Therefore, we
have lifted this restriction and tested the modified model. Now the restriction on the
covariance of the GMT-index and the ES-index is rejected with the highest test statistic. So
we lifted this restriction. The modified model gives no restriction with a test statistic
higher than 3.84 and the Likelihood Ratio-test for the model to be of the specified
structure gives a test-statistic of 14.86 which is well below the critical value of 22.31 for a
χ215-distribution at a significance level of 10%.
Table 2: Table based on Estimation with Cumulative Relaxation of Restrictions
Lifted
Restriction




γε*=-0.028 * ũ + 0.037 *χ - 0.009 * σµ² + 0.565 * θ
(-1.283) (0.189) (-0.452) (2.070)
R²=0.43
DF=17
GMT, σµ² γε*=-0.019 * ũ+0.121 *χ + 0.012 * σµ² + 0.700 * θ
(-0.867) (0.591) (0.647) (2.669)
R²=0.41
DF=16
GMT, ES γε*=-0.019 * ũ+0.171 *χ + 0.015 * σµ² + 0.706 * θ
(-0.822) (0.800) (0.696) (2.501)
R²=0.37
DF=15
Note: t-values in parentheses.
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C. The Data
As proxies for the ultimate determinants of the optimal degree of central bank conserva-
tiveness and independence, we have chosen the following economic and political variables.
For ũ, thenon-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment(NAIRU) is taken from Layard,
Nickell and Jackman (1991). They estimated the NAIRU for nineteen industrial countries
in the period 1960-1988. The proxy for society’s preferences for unemployment
stabilization relative to inflation stabilization (χ) is the number of years that aleft-wing
(socialist) partyhas been in government as a share of thetotal number of years. For, a
left-wing government has a higher preference for unemployment stabilization and, thereby,
the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness and independence increases under a
left-wing government. The variance of productivity shocks (σµ²) is proxied by thevariance
of output growth(GDP) on an annual basis. We compute the slope of the Phillips curve
(θ), using labour’s income share in GDP. Because data for labour’s income share are not
available for all countries in our sample, we have taken the ratio between thecompensation
of employeespaid by resident producers to resident households and GDP.
ũ: R. Layard, S. Nickell and R. Jackman,
Unemployment, Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1991.
Estimates for NAIRU 1960-1988, Table 14, Chapter 9.
χ: Winkler Prins Encyclopedie, 1990.
A.J. Day (ed.),Political Parties of the World, London, Longman, 1988.
(# years that a left-wing party has been in the government, either alone or in a
coalition)/(total # years), 1960-1993.
σµ²: OECD,Main Economic Indicators,various issues.
Growth rate of GDP in US$ in 1985 prices and exchange rates, 1960-1993.
θ: OECD, National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1960-1977, 1977-1989, 1978-1992.
1/[1 - (Compensation of employees paid by resident producers/GDP)], in current
prices.
OECD, Paris, 1979, 1991, 1994.
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